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"A

nother book about Dieppe?"
This is the question
everyone will wonder since the
tragic 1942 Dieppe raid has been
examined so often previously. It is
also the title of Professor
Campbell's first chapter. The aim
of his work is to analyse the raid's
operational aspects, such as
intelligence, radar, deception,
naval and air operations, in the
context of activities in the English
Channel as a whole in 1942. He
uses mainly Allied and German
unpublished primary sources,
many of the latter hitherto unused
war diaries and after action
reports, although all previously
available for many years to the
public. In doing so Campbell
demonstrates his knowledge of the
period by pointing out gaps in the
documentary record resulting
from loss, destruction or
continued classification. The
Dieppe raid, he explains, "was
simply the obvious peg on which
to hang such an investigation."
This investigation examines all
the myths and misconceptions that
usually flourish as a result of a
military failure such as at Dieppe.
Campbell puts these in their

operational context and attempts
to explain or, more often, disprove
each scenario to the reader, acting
like a detective I historian.
Although this reviewer usually
agrees with his conclusions,
Campbell does not always address
all the issues fully, and the process
he takes the reader through is
often extremely confusing.
The most commonly-held myth
about the operation is that it did
not achieve surprise and that the
Germans received forewarning,
resulting in the massacre on the
beaches. All the investigations into
the possibility that some kind of
agent report gave forewarning are
not merely inconclusive. They are
pointless because they do not
establish a link between any leak
and the massacre on the beaches.
They assume that the leak was
listened to and that this explains
the disaster but this ignores the fact
that the Dieppe garrison was not at
alert readiness.
Campbell takes the reader
through a very difficult process of
canvassing each of the many
supposed reports received by the
Abwehr, the German intelligence
service, only to discount each one
in the end. One agent, code-named
Tate, was controlled by the XX or
Twenty Committee, the organisation
responsible for running double
agents usually for misinformation
purposes. Campbell asks could
Tate have been allowed to send a
warning in order to build up the
credibility of XX agents with the
Abwehr? Campbell adds that Tate
would not have been useful in this
role since, as opposed to the
controlled agents reporting to
Madrid and Lisbon, his traffic
passed by landline between
Hamburg and Berlin, and therefore
could not be intercepted and
deciphered by the Government
Code and Cipher School (GC and
CS). Here Campbell errs. GC and
CS was not interested in what Tate
sent since they already knew what
it was. At the very least they had
some input into all of his reports
and sometimes even compiled
them. They were interested in the
German reaction to his reports

which they could read through
Ultra decrypts. This complicated
story is confused further by the oft
quoted agent report, T 1022 1677
of 29 October 1942. This he
unfortunately refers to under
several different dates.
Could Ultra could be relied on
to warn that the Germans had
advance knowledge of the raid?
Although he does not directly
answer, undoubtedly it is yes. The
Naval Section of the GC and CS
read all German naval signals
intelligence in the Channel and this,
as Campbell himself says, provided
"a ready check on the occasions
when the German defensive
machine reacted to the threat of an
Allied operation."
On the question of German
foreknowledge Campbell concludes
that with all the Allied and German
documents available, it is obvious
that the Germans received no
warning and were surprised. If any
reports were received before the
raid, they were either not passed
on to the local garrison or ignored
by the respective authorities in
Berlin. This is shown by the fact
that after receiving reports in May,
June and July of an intended
landing the Germans sounded the
alarm dozens of times, at many
places along the coast from Norway
to France, but did not do so for the
18/19 August in the Dieppe area.
The bulk of two long-range bomber
groups, the only torpedo bomber
unit in the Luftwaffe and an E-boat
unit, the latter two extremely
effective in the anti-raid role, were
also moved away from the
operational area before the raid.
Campbell gives a good analysis
of the strategic context in which
Jubilee was decided on and
effectively impresses on the reader
the atmosphere of semi-crisis
prevailing at that time in Combined
Operations Headquarters (COHQ).
He contends that revival of the
cancelled operation took place "at
a highly secret meeting on 11 July,"
although his only evidence is the
very dubious post-war memoirs of
Hughes-Hallett, COHQ Naval
Advisor at the time.
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Campbell correctly states that
deception,
using the XX
organisation, was not being
practised actively until the end of
September 1942 but does not
explain why. The reason was that
the security authorities were not
fully convinced that all German
agents in the United Kingdom were
under control. Campbell also
states: "That the raid might have
been somehow saved by a cover
plan remains doubtful, as will be
argued later." Unfortunately, he
never addresses the point again.
He asserts that Sir John
Masterman "regretted" Jubilee had
not been properly covered, which
meant using the XX system to gain
surprise, by referring to an earlier
quote by Masterman that: "It is sad,
but interesting, to speculate
whether the Dieppe raid might have
been more successful. or at least
less costly, if it had been effectively
covered." This is not "regret" on
Masterman's part but actually pure,
worthless speculation. It is
pointless regretting or speculating
whether Jubilee might have been
more successful if covered using the
XX organisation, since Jubilee
gained surprise without it. When
Masterman asks whether it would
have been "less costly," he is
assuming that Jubilee might not
have been defeated if the German
strategic reserves had not been
redeployed. Campbell does not
comment on this, possibly because
it is an irrelevant question,
although the answer is defmitely no.
The operation was defeated by the
static coastal defence forces, no
strategic reserves were involved, the
latter being the only units that
would have been affected by any
cover or deception operation.
Besides the strategic reserves
would have taken too long to get
into action to be of significance to
operations of such short duration
as Jubilee. Campbell raises the
point that the collision of Jubilee
with a German coastal convoy
actually proved to be a "stroke of
good fortune" since it "provided a
form of cover." The German radar
operators ignored the radar plots

of Jubilee since they had a convoy
of their own in the area. This would
have been the case, though, even if
Jubilee had not collided with the
convoy. Here Campbell is using
confusing language for it was the
presence of the German convoy that
deflected the German operators
from their important radar plots,
not the convoy's collision with
Jubilee. Actually, the collision was
a stroke of misfortune because the
German defenders of Puys who,
Campbell correctly states, had been
on a night exercise, "did not stand
down before dawn because of the
gunfire at sea."
Whether this convoy was
picked up by British shore radar
stations is a matter of on going
debate and Campbell still has not
clarified it. He also does not
adequately explain the difference in
timings between the various
warning signals supposedly sent to
Jubilee. He records Hughes-Hallett
and apparently the Admiralty,
through Mountbatten, as asserting
that the inshore convoy was never
plotted by shore radar Although
Campbell
says
this
was
"misleading" he does not critically
comment further. He also ignores
the fact that the Admiralty report
contradicts the above assertion:
"The enemy was, however, located
by shore radar stations, and was
plotted by Portsmouth .... "
An interesting revelation is that
the move of the 10 Panzer Division
from Scissons to Amiens, within
striking distance of Dieppe, was
actually known by British
intelligence in June, earlier than the
13 July quoted in the wartime
official history of British
intelligence. Campbell proves that
the movement of this division
earlier was the main reason for the
initial Rutter plan being changed on
5 July from a two-tide to a one tide
operation.
The final chapter
examines the controversy over the
relationship between Jubilee and
the successful Normandy landings
almost two years later. All the
supposed lessons learned are
examined in the light of historical
evidence and rarely is there more

than a bare mention of Dieppe.
One of the main reasons according
to Campbell is the long time gap
between the two operations, and
that many other large-scale
landings, such as in North Mrica,
Sicily, Italy and the Pacific Islands,
happened in between for the raid
to have contributed much to future
invasion planning. Campbell also
shows that by 1944 the Germans
would have fortified all the Channel
ports anyway, as a matter of
strategic principal and because of
their experiences in Italy. Also for
certain is that D-Day would have
occurred in 1944 without Jubilee.
Campbell does admit to lessons
learned at the sharp end, one
example being the impetus given to
development of the Armoured
Vehicle Royal Engineers.
Looking at the book as a whole,
although the research has been
meticulous and the conclusions,
when reached, are accurate, the
presentation is unfortunately
lacking. Overall it is very
haphazard, confusing and
complicated to follow. Leaving these
criticisms aside, the book is
recommended to anyone who is
interested in the Dieppe raid or the
Normandy landings, and no doubt
it will become a standard work.
Hugh G. Henry
St. John's College, Cambridge
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t is with good reason that a recent
book on the Canadian Merchant
Navy, written by Robert G. Halford,
has been titled The Unknown
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